La Plataforma de Acción de Beijing en 1995, señala que la violencia contra las mujeres "es una manifestación de las relaciones de poder históricamente desiguales entre hombres y mujeres". En todos los ámbitos y etapas de la vida de las mujeres existen diversas formas en que la violencia de genero se expresa, pudiendo citar la violencia física, psicológica y sexual por parte de miembros de la familia o de su pareja, el abuso sexual por individuos que no son su pareja, (...) la prostitución forzada, la mutilación genital, el aborto selectivo, entre otras. Las consecuencias para la salud de las mujeres y sus familias urgen al sistema sanitario a tomar medidas para su identificación oportuna y respuestas adecuadas. Sin embargo, para que esto sea cierto se deben examinar las formas de reproducción de las desiguales relaciones de poder entre hombres y mujeres al interior del sistema y sus instituciones. (shrink)

The fruits of knowledge—such as books, data, and ideas—tend to generate far more attention than the ways in which knowledge is produced and acquired. Correcting this imbalance, Making Knowledge in Early Modern Europe brings together a wide-ranging yet tightly integrated series of essays that explore how knowledge was obtained and demonstrated in Europe during an intellectually explosive four centuries, when standard methods of inquiry took shape across several fields of intellectual pursuit. Composed by scholars in disciplines ranging from the history (...) of science to art history to religious studies, the pieces collected here look at the production and consumption of knowledge as a social process within many different communities. They focus, in particular, on how the methods employed by scientists and intellectuals came to interact with the practices of craftspeople and practitioners to create new ways of knowing. Examining the role of texts, reading habits, painting methods, and countless other forms of knowledge making, this volume brilliantly illuminates the myriad ways these processes affected and were affected by the period’s monumental shifts in culture and learning. (shrink)

Examines the relationship between making objects and knowing nature in Europe from the mid-15th to mid-19th centuries.

Science has always been tightly associated with environmental ethics in a way traditional ethics has not. However, despite this proximity, science has had a merely informational role, where it must inform ethics but not intervene in ethical judgment. Science is seen as an amoral enterprise, requiring an ethics rather than recommending one. In this paper I try to go against this common view. First, I give a critique of the naturalistic fallacy following the lines of Frankena. Then I go on (...) to describe the two possible roles science can have in ethical though, and in environmental ethics in particular. As it turns out, science does not only inform ethics, but can actually have moral import and intervene in moral judgment. Finally, from an ecocentric point of view, I try to illustrate this last point by construing the ecological notion of resilience as a moral boundary—a scientifically determined boundary between right and wrong. (shrink)

Resumen: En su libro Mujeres y discursos gerenciales. Hacia la autogestión feminista, María Medina-Vicent aborda desde una perspectiva crítica feminista los discursos gerenciales dirigidos a las mujeres, desvelando el androcentrismo y la presencia —y perpetuación— de tradicionales roles y estereotipos de género en los modelos de gestión. Mi propuesta pretende incidir en dos aspectos del análisis realizado por Medina-Vicent, por un lado, remarcar los peligros de la despolitización de los discursos gerenciales dirigidos a mujeres —sobre todo en tanto que la (...) literatura gerencial acaba por informarnos a todas—. Por otro, profundizar en la crítica que la autora realiza de la cooptación del feminismo por parte de estos discursos.: In her book Mujeres y discursos gerenciales. Hacia la autogestión feminista, Medina-Vicent approaches management discourses aimed at women from a critical feminist perspective, revealing the androcentrism and the presence and perpetuation of traditional gender roles and stereotypes in management models. My proposal aims to highlight two aspects of Medina-Vicent’s analysis: on the one hand, to highlight the dangers of depoliticizing management discourses aimed at women - especially insofar as management literature ends up informing us all. On the other hand, the author’s critique of the co-optation of feminism by these discourses will be explored in greater depth. Palabras clave: discursos gerenciales, teoría feminista, antifeminismo, despolitización. Keywords: managerial discourses, feminist theory, antifeminism, depoliticization. (shrink)

En el último tercio del siglo XIX y comienzos del XX, la prensa se constituyó en el medio más eficaz de difusión y conocimiento de la moda. Las revistas dirigidas a la mujer se encargaron de divulgar la moda con el fin de orientar su participación en el consumo de la misma. Un buen ejemplo de ello nos lo ofrece la revista La mujer donde coexisten discursos paralelos y contradictorios sobre los efectos que la moda ocasiona en la mujer y (...) en la sociedad. La prensa destacó la importancia que la moda ejercía en la belleza de la mujer y al mismo tiempo se encargó de tranquilizar al patriarcado justificando que la belleza de la mujer debía ser exclusivamente para agradar al marido. Los recursos publicitarios; grabados, anuncios, figurines, láminas, etc., que utiliza la prensa de esta época, sirven para la construcción de un nuevo modelo de feminidad más acorde con determinados aspectos de la modernización. La publicidad sirve como aliciente para que la mujer burguesa adquiera mayor protagonismo en la concepción de lo moderno y dentro del contexto urbano que es donde se desarrolla el consumo de la moda. (shrink)

Abstract:Representations of the space of the village, the wilderness, and the overlapping edge of the forest between them often play a critical role in intercultural collisions between the “developing” world's spaces and pressures from the ‘developed’ world's activities within them. These collisions include land grabs and resource extraction, conversion of forest or wilderness to mechanized agriculture, uneven legal disputes over what constitutes ownership and use, and conservation efforts to reduce climate change or restore genetic biodiversity in forests. This study illuminates (...) how the physical and perceptual spaces of village, wilderness, and forest change, resist change, and are forced to change in three key domains: health (traditional medicine), food security (hunting, farming, and resource extraction in general), and use-ownership (as indigenous knowledge, occupancy, and access to land-use generally). Findings from the study disclose a need to include time (as the pace of change) whenever changed perceptions of space are proposed or occur. Recommendations include applying the criterion to strive always for the least disruptive (short-term) procedures for addressing a problem such that those outcomes achieve the most sustainable impacts over the long-term. (shrink)

A good number of people currently thinking and writing about reasons identify a reason as a consideration that counts in favor of an action or attitude.1 I will argue that using this as our fundamental account of what a reason is generates a fairly deep and recalcitrant ambiguity; this account fails to distinguish between two quite different sets of considerations that count in favor of certain attitudes, only one of which are the “proper” or “appropriate” kind of reason for them. (...) This ambiguity has been the topic of recent discussion, under the head “the wrong kind of reasons problem.”2 I will suggest that confusion about “the wrong kind of reason” will be dispelled by changing our account of what a reason is. While I agree both that reasons are considerations and that certain.. (shrink)

Many assume that we can be responsible only what is voluntary. This leads to puzzlement about our responsibility for our beliefs, since beliefs seem not to be voluntary. I argue against the initial assumption, presenting an account of responsibility and of voluntariness according to which, not only is voluntariness not required for responsibility, but the feature which renders an attitude a fundamental object of responsibility (that the attitude embodies one’s take on the world and one’s place in it) also guarantees (...) that it could not be voluntary. It turns out, then, that, for failing to be voluntary, beliefs are a central example of the sort of thing for which we are most fundamentally responsible. (shrink)

I hope to show that, although belief is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, "believing at will" is impossible; one cannot believe in the way one ordinarily acts. Further, the same is true of intention: although intention is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, the features of belief that render believing less than voluntary are present for intention, as well. It turns out, perhaps surprisingly, that you can no more intend at will than believe at will.

According to ‘Excluders’, descriptive uncertainty – but not normative uncertainty – matters to what we ought to do. Recently, several authors have argued that those wishing to treat normative uncertainty differently from descriptive uncertainty face a dependence problem because one's descriptive uncertainty can depend on one's normative uncertainty. The aim of this paper is to determine whether the phenomenon of dependence poses a decisive problem for Excluders. I argue that existing arguments fail to show this, and that, while stronger ones (...) can be found, Excluders can escape them. (shrink)

Objective: To assess the knowledge of four groups of individuals regarding who is legally authorised to consent to health care or research involving older patients.Design: A provincewide postal survey.Setting: Province of Quebec, Canada.Participants: Three hundred older adults, 434 informal caregivers of cognitively impaired individuals, 98 researchers in aging and 136 members of research ethics boards .Measurements: Knowledge was assessed through a pretested postal questionnaire comprising five vignettes that describe hypothetical situations involving an older adult who requires medical care or is (...) solicited for research. The respondent had to identify the person who is legally authorised to provide consent.Results: Nearly 80% of all respondents provided the correct answer when the hypothetical scenario depicted a person who was competent to consent or incompetent but legally represented. Knowledge was worse for the scenario describing a research situation that involved an incompetent adult without a legal guardian.Conclusion: The observed lack of knowledge raises doubts about the ability of current legislation to truly protect the rights of older adults with diminished decision making capacity. It points to the need for educational programmes aimed at increasing public awareness of the legislation put in place for those requiring special protection. (shrink)

Una profesora de secundaria narra en tres momentos distintos los sucesos que han marcado su devenir como mujer, madre y enseñante durante la pandemia por COVID-19. En un recorrido que transcurre entre la sorpresa, la incertidumbre y el desencanto, emerge la reflexión de que la escuela ya no es ni será la misma, no solo por la diferencia entre la educación presencial y a distancia, sino porque las vidas de todos y todas se han transformado, porque muchos escolares han dejado (...) la escuela, más de cinco millones de niños, niñas y jóvenes. Afirma con contundencia ¡Este bicho tiene aporofobia! en alusión a la desigualdad social y la afectación a las personas en situación de pobreza. Reflexiona en torno a las distintas respuestas del profesorado y del sistema educativo, haciendo una fuerte crítica a la viabilidad y resultados del modelo “aprende en casa”. De ninguna manera es ajena a los efectos de la pandemia en los planos económico, laboral y educativo, pero se muestra renuente a dar credibilidad y adoptar soluciones que ubican la problemática solo en el plano de la voluntad y esfuerzo personal, sin reconocer que se trata de una crisis sistémica, que abarca a las instituciones sociales en conjunto. La expresión de emociones, vivencias y aprendizajes no esperados ante la ruptura de lo cotidiano, así como la experiencia del confinamiento por más de año y medio, permiten avizorar una nueva subjetividad en los actores de la educación, que deberá ser tomada en cuenta en el eventual regreso a los planteles escolares. (shrink)

In this paper I consider fairness of blaming a wrongdoer. In particular, I consider the claim that blaming a wrongdoer can be unfair because blame has a certain characteristic force, a force which is not fairly imposed upon the wrongdoer unless certain conditions are met--unless, e.g., the wrongdoer could have done otherwise, or unless she is someone capable of having done right, or unless she is able to control her behavior by the light of moral reasons. While agreeing that blame (...) has a characteristic force, I am skeptical of this charge of unfairness. My skepticism concerns itself less with the particular conditions of fairness proposed than with the idea that blame can be rendered unfair by its characteristic force. If to blame a person were simply to perform certain intentional actions, then, as we will see, blame could be rendered unfair by its force. But to blame a person is not just to act in certain ways. It is, at least in large part, to make certain judgments or adopt certain attitudes. However, it is unclear how these attitudes or judgments carry "force"? and also unclear whether they can be rendered unfair by their force. Examining these issues, I will suggest that much of the force of blame is found in a set of judgments--most centrally, the judgment that one person failed to show proper regard for others. But, I will argue, once it is granted that such judgments are true, their characteristic force cannot render them unfair. (shrink)

I first pose a challenge which, it seems to me, any philosophical account of forgiveness must meet: the account must be articulate and it must allow for forgiveness that is uncompromising. I then examine an account of forgiveness which appears to meet this challenge. Upon closer examination we discover that this account actually fails to meet the challenge—but it fails in very instructive ways. The account takes two missteps which seem to be taken by almost everyone discussing forgiveness. At the (...) end, I sketch an alternative account of forgiveness, one that I think meets the challenge and avoids the missteps. (shrink)

We sometimes seem to face fundamental moral uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty about what is morally good or morally right that cannot be reduced to ordinary descriptive uncertainty. This phenomenon raises a puzzle for noncognitivism, according to which moral judgments are desire-like attitudes as opposed to belief-like attitudes. Can a state of moral uncertainty really be a noncognitive state? So far, noncognitivists have not been able to offer a completely satisfactory account. Here, we argue that noncognitivists should exploit the formal analogy between (...) moral uncertainty and moral multi-objective decision problems. Our ‘multi-objective story’ enables noncognitivists to save our moral uncertainty thought and talk by explaining how the underlying phenomenon could be noncognitive. (shrink)

A common line of thought claims that we are responsible for ourselves and our actions, while less sophisticated creatures are not, because we are, and they are not, self-aware. Our self-awareness is thought to provide us with a kind of control over ourselves that they lack: we can reflect upon ourselves, upon our thoughts and actions, and so ensure that they are as we would have them to be. Thus, our capacity for reflection provides us with the control over ourselves (...) that grounds our responsibility. I argue that this thought is subtly, but badly, confused. It uses, as its model for the control that grounds our responsibility, the kind of control we exercise over ordinary objects and over our own voluntary actions: we represent to ourselves what to do or how to change things, and then we bring about that which we represent. But we cannot use this model to explain our responsibility for ourselves and our actions: if there is a question about why or how we are responsible for ourselves and our actions, it cannot be answered by appeal to a sophisticated, self-directed action. There must be some more fundamental account of how or why we are responsible. I replace the usual account with a novel but natural view: responsible mental activity can be modeled, not as an ordinary action, but as the settling of a question. This shift will require abandoning the tempting but troublesome thought that responsible activity involves discretion and awareness—which, I argue, we must abandon in any case. (shrink)

Although theoretically rigorous, the book is comprehensible to the beginning qualitative researcher.

I argue to a conclusion I find at once surprising and intuitive: although many considerations show trust useful, valuable, important, or required, these are not the reasons for which one trusts a particular person to do a particular thing. The reasons for which one trusts a particular person on a particular occasion concern, not the value, importance, or necessity of trust itself, but rather the trustworthiness of the person in question in the matter at hand. In fact, I will suggest (...) that the degree to which you trust a particular person to do a particular thing will vary inversely with the degree to which you must rely, for the motivation or justification of your trusting response, on reasons that concern the importance, or value, or necessity of having such a response. (shrink)

This third edition of the bestselling An Introduction to Sociology: Feminist Perspectives confirms the ongoing centrality of feminist perspectives and research to the sociological enterprise and introduces students to the wide range of feminist contributions to key areas of sociological concern. This completely revised edition includes: · new chapters on sexuality and the media · additional material on race and ethnicity, disability and the body · many new international and comparative examples · the influence of theories of globalization and post-colonial (...) studies. The theoretical elements have also been fully rethought in light of recent developments in social theory. Written by three experienced academics, this book gives students of sociology and women's studies an accessible overview of the feminist contribution to all the key areas of sociological concern. (shrink)

Adults who are incapacitated and alone, having no surrogates, may be known as “unbefriended.” Decision-making for these particularly vulnerable patients is a common and vexing concern for healthcare providers and hospital ethics committees. When all other avenues for resolving the need for surrogate decision-making fail, patients who are incapacitated and alone may be referred for “public guardianship” or guardianship of last resort. While an appropriate mechanism in theory, these programs are often under-staffed and under-funded, laying the consequences of inadequacies on (...) the healthcare system and the patient him or herself. We describe a qualitative study of professionals spanning clinical, court, and agency settings about the mechanisms for resolving surrogate consent for these patients and problems therein within the state of Massachusetts. Interviews found that all participants encountered adults who are incapacitated and without surrogates. Four approaches for addressing surrogate needs were: work to restore capacity; find previously unknown surrogates; work with agencies to obtain surrogates; and access the guardianship system. The use of guardianship was associated with procedural challenges and ethical concerns including delays in care, short term gains for long term costs, inabilities to meet a patient’s values and preferences, conflicts of interest, and ethical discomfort among interviewees. Findings are discussed in the context of resources to restore capacity, identify previously unknown surrogates, and establish improved surrogate mechanisms for this vulnerable population. (shrink)

We argue that philosophers are competent to facilitate public discussion concerning restrictions on human migration across political borders. We also argue that presenting public audiences with a prima facie case for open borders offers a unique opportunity to elucidate important aspects of philosophical reasoning. Finally, we share resources and a lesson plan for those keen to examine the case for open borders with students, or to facilitate public discussion on these issues.

In the classical Turing test, participants are challenged to tell whether they are interacting with another human being or with a machine. The way the interaction takes place is not direct, but a distant conversation through computer screen messages. Basic forms of interaction are face-to-face and embodied, context-dependent and based on the detection of reciprocal sensorimotor contingencies. Our idea is that interaction detection requires the integration of proprioceptive and interoceptive patterns with sensorimotor patterns, within quite short time lapses, so that (...) they appear as mutually contingent, as reciprocal. In other words, the experience of interaction takes place when sensorimotor patterns are contingent upon one’s own movements, and vice versa. I react to your movement, you react to mine. When I notice both components, I come to experience an interaction. Therefore, we designed a “minimal” Turing test to investigate how much information is required to detect these reciprocal sensorimotor contingencies. Using a new version of the perceptual crossing paradigm, we tested whether participants resorted to interaction detection to tell apart human from machine agents in repeated encounters with these agents. In two studies, we presented participants with movements of a human agent, either online or offline, and movements of a computerized oscillatory agent in three different blocks. In each block, either auditory or audiovisual feedback was provided along each trial. Analysis of participants’ explicit responses and of the implicit information subsumed in the dynamics of their series will reveal evidence that participants use the reciprocal sensorimotor contingencies within short time windows. For a machine to pass this minimal Turing test, it should be able to generate this sort of reciprocal contingencies. (shrink)

It has seemed to many philosophers—perhaps to most—that believing is not voluntary, that we cannot believe at will. It has seemed to many of these that this inability is not a merely contingent psychological limitation but rather is a deep fact about belief, perhaps a conceptual limitation. But it has been very difficult to say exactly why we cannot believe at will. I earlier offered an account of why we cannot believe at will. I argued that nothing could qualify both (...) as having been done “at will,” in the relevant sense, and as a belief. Thus, no believer could believe at will. If my arguments are correct, our inability to believe at will reveals no genuine lack in our powers of mind, any more than an inability to draw a square circle reveals a lack of artistic skill. My account has been recently criticized by Kieran Setiya, who has provided an account of his own. Here I revisit and defend my account, hopefully in a way that will both make my thought clearer and illumine some of the broader differences between Setiya’s approach and my own. I then briefly consider Setiya’s own argument, in part to further develop the contrast. (shrink)

The popularity and profitability of American gridiron football is beyond dispute. Recent polls put football as the overwhelming favorite of people who follow at least one sport and huge revenues are reported at both the professional and the university level. We know, however, that what is the case tells us little about what ought to be the case, and it is to the latter question that this paper is directed. I offer a three-pronged attack on the ethical acceptability of American (...) football, both amateur and professional, based on harm to the players, objectification of the players, and harm to others done by the players, leading to the conclusion that the sport, as currently constituted, is morally unacceptable. (shrink)

Donald Davidson opens ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’ by asking, ‘What is the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains the action by giving the agent's reason for doing what he did?’ His answer has generated some confusion about reasons for action and made for some difficulty in understanding the place for the agent's own reasons for acting, in the explanation of an action. I offer here a different account of the explanation of action, one that, though (...) minimal and formal, preserves the proper role for the agent's own reasons for acting. (shrink)

I will argue that making a certain assumption allows us to conceptualize more clearly our agency over our minds. The assumption is this: certain attitudes (most uncontroversially, belief and intention) embody their subject’s answer to some question or set of questions. I will first explain the assumption and then show that, given the assumption, we should expect to exercise agency over this class of attitudes in (at least) two distinct ways: by answering for ourselves the question they embody and by (...) acting upon them in ways designed to affect them according to our purposes—in roughly the way we exercise agency over most ordinary objects. (shrink)

Nearly sixty years after its publication, P. F. Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment” continues to inspire important work. Its main legacy has been the notion of “reactive attitudes.” Surprisingly, Strawson’s central argument—an argument to the conclusion that no general thesis (such as the thesis of determinism) could provide us reason to abandon these attitudes—has received little attention. When the argument is considered, it is often interpreted as relying on a claim about our psychological capacities: we are simply not capable of abandoning (...) the reactive attitudes, across the board, in something like the way we are simply not capable of remembering everything we are told. A different line interprets Strawson as relying on something like a conceptual point: you can neither support nor call into question the whole of a practice using notions that are, themselves, constituted by that practice. Neither interpretation would lead to you to expect what you will find, looking at the central text: Strawson twice accuses his opponent of being caught in some kind of contradiction. So neither interpretation, on its own, is correct. By providing a close reading of the central text, I do my best to articulate Strawson’s more interesting, and more powerful, argument. The argument depends on an underlying picture of the nature of moral demands and moral relationships—a picture that has gone largely unnoticed, that is naturalistic without being reductionistic, and that is, I think, worthy of serious consideration. (shrink)

Here I defend my solution to the wrong-kind-of-reason problem against Mark Schroeder’s criticisms. In doing so, I highlight an important difference between other accounts of reasons and my own. While others understand reasons as considerations that count in favor of attitudes, I understand reasons as considerations that bear (or are taken to bear) on questions. Thus, to relate reasons to attitudes, on my account, we must consider the relation between attitudes and questions. By considering that relation, we not only solve (...) the wrong-kind-of-reason problem, but we also bring into view rational agency—the use of reasons in thought. (shrink)

The recent political “left turn” in Latin America has led to an increased emphasis on social policy and poverty alleviation programs aimed at women. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork and interviews in a rural village in Nicaragua, I argue that one of the consequences of such programs is an increase in women’s daily workload, which I call the gendered burden of development. By exploiting women’s unpaid community care labor, these non-governmental organizations and state-led programs entrench established gender roles and responsibilities. Furthermore, (...) through their selective interventions, these programs reinforce the neoliberal ideal of self-sufficiency in women’s everyday lives, contributing to the formation of a particular kind of developmental subject who assumes responsibility for her own hardships. Although these programs have produced some tangible improvements in women’s lives, they ultimately do little to alter the structural conditions affecting the precariousness of women’s survival. (shrink)

ABSTRACTExperiences that contradict one's core concepts elicit intense emotions. Such schema incongruence can elicit awe, wherein experiences that are too vast...

Este ensayo describe una particular experiencia estética, basada en la obra gráfica La confianza, de Goya, perteneciente a la serie de los Caprichos e invenciones, que son paisajes de pesadilla que ilustran la crisis social de la época de las Luces. Desde aquí, desarrollaré una hermenéutica personal que avanza por tres escenarios teóricos sobre lo que implicaría la confianza de una mujer en otra, a partir del soporte de imagen. Las diversas tesis teóricas se sitúan en la órbita del pensamiento (...) feminista de actualidad y en donde se representarán a tres autoras: Muraro, Despentes y Braidotti. Finalmente, este dispositivo de interpretación permitirá relevar el arte de Goya a propósito de una posible revisión de crítica social sobre la virtud de la confianza. (shrink)

The aim of this work is to end the debate about the widespread acceptance among specialists, that the 6th century Byzantium treatise by Cassianus reached Muslim scholars by means of two routes: a translation from Greek into Arabic and the other translation by means of a Persian translation. Thanks to a comparison of the texts, one can prove beyond all doubt that there was only a secondary translation route into Arabic from the Persian version. Additionally, this work highlights the significant (...) influence of the Fila[hdotu]arumiyya on the Andalusian agronomy. The most influenced subjects are pointed out and those agronomic sources derived from this treatise and the 10th century Greek Geoponica are studied. This study allows us to conclude that the later work was never translated into Arabic, therefore, the Andalusian agronomists only had access to the Arabic versions of Anatolius and Cassianus to which the Pseudo-Qus[tdotu]us' work was later added. (shrink)

Primeiramente, oferecemos uma apresentação teórica da representação do pensamento prático, começando pela distinção entre silogismo dialético e silogismo demonstrativo. Fazemos referência à crítica de Toulmin contra o dedutivismo dominante de seu tempo. Em seguida, fornecemos argumentos para apoiar a relevância heurística do modelo de Toulmin para entender a discussão sobre a inclusão da lógica padrão na representação do pensamento comum. Afirmamos que o projeto analítico toulmaniano permite entender, com clareza metódica, a derrotabilidade dos argumentos do senso comum por meio da (...) investigação da noção modal de probabilidade na linguagem comum. First, we offer theoretical resemblance of the representation of practical reasoning, beginning with the distinction between demonstrative and dialectical syllogism. We make reference to the Toulmin’s critique against to the dominant deductivism in his time. Then we give arguments to sustain the heuristic relevance of Toulmin’s model to understand the discussion about the inclusion of default logics in the representation of ordinary reasoning. We assert that the Toulminian analytic design allows to understand, with methodical clarity, the defeasibility of common sense arguments by means of the investigation of the modal notion of probability in ordinary language. (shrink)

Resumen: El presente trabajo intenta analizar los elementos críticos a la base de aquella suerte de prescripción que Edward Said formulara a los intelectuales bajo la célebre consigna de “decir las verdades al poder”, esto es, de interpelar públicamente al poder -político, económico, religioso, militar- frente a toda evidencia de injusticia, inconsistencia o turbia manipulación en su operar. En tanto tal, y a partir de nuestra lectura de Said, delimitamos cinco dilemas que el intelectual ha de resolver, en tanto requisitos (...) para decir las verdades al poder: orientación intramundana versus extramundana, rol profético versus sacerdotal, libertad universalista versus organicidad, racionalidad sustantiva versus instrumental y arrojo versus temor. Se comentan las implicaciones de estos dilemas a la luz de los desafíos y oportunidades que las sociedades contemporáneas -en particular, las latinoamericanas- presentan para el rol del intelectual.: This work analyzes the critical foundations of that quasi-rule posed by Edward Said to intellectuals through the famous motto “speaking truth to power”, that is, of publicly interpellating to power -political, economic, religious, military- whenever its exercise may involve injustice, inconsistency or underhanded manipulation. So, according to our interpretation of Said’s work, we identify five dilemmas the intellectual should resolve in order to be able to speak truth to power: a worldliness orientation versus an otherworldliness one, a prophetic role versus a priestly one, universalist freedom versus organic compromise, a substantive rationality versus an instrumental one, and courage versus fear. Involvements of these dilemmas are discussed according to the challenges and opportunities posed by current societies -in particular, the Latin American ones- to the intellectual’s role. (shrink)

Las tierras arrasadas de Emiliano Monge se encuentra entre el creciente corpus de novelas y películassobre los migrantes centroamericanos y los diferentes tipos de violencia que afrontan. Monge aborda en esta obra los efectos de la militarización en la política migratoria de México, impulsada por la guerra contra el narco que comenzó en 2006. Esta novela lleva a cabo un desmonte crítico del humanitarismo literario al tiempo que enfatiza la vulnerabilidad de los migrantes y su agencia. En tal sentido, se (...) explora la forma en la que, en cuanto ficción posthumanitaria, la novela encarna las diferentes formas en que opera el orden necropolítico en la vulnerabilidad de estos migrantes centroamericanos indocumentados a lo largo de su periplo. (shrink)